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Abstract
In this paper we present formulas for the valuation of debt and equity of firms in a financial
network under comonotonic endowments. We demonstrate that the comonotonic setting pro-
vides a lower bound to the price of debt under Eisenberg-Noe financial networks with consistent
marginal endowments. Such financial networks encode the interconnection of firms through debt
claims. The proposed pricing formulas consider the realized, endogenous, recovery rate on debt
claims. Special consideration will be given to the setting in which firms only invest in a risk-free
bond and a common risky asset following a geometric Brownian motion.
1 Introduction
In this work we consider the problem of valuation of corporate debt and determining the market
capitalization. Traditionally, two alternative approaches have been followed. The first of these
approaches is the structural approach, which was introduced in the seminal paper of Merton
[1974]. Merton considered the debt and equity of a firm to be derivatives on the value of the
assets of the firm where the strike price is given by the firm’s liabilities. Merton’s model has
been extended in many directions and forms the basis of modern structural credit risk models,
used in the Basel 2 framework and KMV. In these models, the value of the firm’s assets is given
by an underlying stochastic process and a credit event occurs when the value of the assets fall
∗Washington University in St. Louis, Department of Electrical and Systems Engineering, St. Louis, MO 63130,
USA.
†Washington University in St. Louis, Department of Electrical and Systems Engineering, St. Louis, MO 63130,
USA. zfeinstein@wustl.edu
1
below the liabilities of the firm. The second approach is the reduced form approach where the
modeling is done from a more statistical perspective, taking into account the historical default
intensities and the underlying stochastic factors (Duffie and Singleton [1999]). In this paper, we
will focus exclusively on the structural approach.
The valuation in structural models is generally done from the perspective of an individual
bank. However, this does not take into account the myriad interconnections that exist within a
financial system. As evidenced by the 2007-2009 financial crisis, considering the risk of a single
firm alone can cause gross misspecification in firm health. In this work, we will focus on inter-
connections through correlated assets as well as interbank debt claims. These interconnections
effectively link the balance sheets of different banks and make the value of a firm dependent on
the performance of other firms. These shared connections might open up avenues for shared
prosperity but also introduce potential channels for contagion. These avenues of contagion be-
come particularly significant during a financial crisis where the default of one firm might cause
the failure in other firms. This effect is also referred to as cascading defaults.
Since the 2007-2009 financial crisis there have been significant efforts to study the effects of
interconnection within the financial system, with particular emphasis on modeling and quanti-
fying systemic risk. One of the primary approaches for modeling systemic risk is fundamentally
network-based. The seminal paper Eisenberg and Noe [2001] models these financial dependen-
cies as a directed graph. In this approach, firms must meet their full liabilities by transferring
their assets, otherwise they are deemed insolvent and are unable to pay out in full. This in-
ability to make the full payment can, in turn, make other banks default, thus resulting in
cascading failures. This interdependency of realized (clearing) payments is modeled as a fixed
point problem. Eisenberg and Noe [2001] prove the existence and uniqueness of the clearing
payments and provides an elegant algorithm for the computation of the same. This baseline
setting of Eisenberg-Noe has been extended in many directions to account for more realis-
tic situations. Interconnections through cross-holdings have been considered in Suzuki [2002],
Gouriéroux et al. [2012, 2013]. More complicated forms of dependency like simultaneous credit
default swaps and (re)insurance payments have been studied in Banerjee and Feinstein [2018],
Schuldenzucker et al. [2017], Klages-Mundt and Minca [2018]. Inclusion of short-term borrow-
ing and the implications on financial contagion has been studied in Bichuch and Feinstein [2018].
The dynamic form of these dependencies, represented by a time dependent liability struc-
ture has been studied in Banerjee et al. [2018], Kusnetsov and Veraart [2018], Capponi et al.
[2016]. Realistic default mechanisms in the form of bankruptcy cost has been studied in
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Elsinger [2009], Rogers and Veraart [2013], Elliott et al. [2014], Glasserman and Young [2015],
Weber and Weske [2017], Capponi et al. [2016], Veraart [2017].
Central banks and regulatory bodies have incorporated these network models into their stress
tests of the financial system (see, e.g., Anand et al. [2014], Hałaj and Kok [2015], Boss et al.
[2004], Elsinger et al. [2013], Upper [2011], Gai et al. [2011]). As such, valuing claims that take
the full network effects into account is imperative so that the true risk of the claims are also
taken into account. In the Eisenberg-Noe framework for interbank payments, this valuation
problem has been considered in multiple works by means of a structural approach. Suzuki
[2002] considers the problem in a setting with cross-holdings and Fischer [2014] generalizes that
setting to include multiple seniority classes and derivatives; these works rely solely on Monte
Carlo simulation for numerical computations. Gouriéroux et al. [2012] considers a model with
random exogenous shocks on the assets of each bank. Gouriéroux et al. [2013] gives an interpre-
tation of this problem as one with a “hidden” CDO. Barucca et al. [2016] considers the problem
of network valuation and the effect of a random exogenous shock in the external assets. A
different approach is considered in Itkin and Lipton [2017] where a PDE method is used for the
case where the banks’ assets are driven by correlated multidimensional Brownian motions with
drift. A reduced form model for studying distress contagion and mark-to-market write-downs of
debt contagion has been studied by Veraart [2017]. A common thread of the existing literature
is that explicit, analytical solutions are considered only for cases with either no direct intercon-
nection between firms or where the number of firms in the system is very low. We wish to note
that the general methodology of Gouriéroux et al. [2012] requires partitioning the endowment
space into 2n possible default scenarios in a system with n banks. Therefore computing the
expectation suffers from the curse of dimensionality and is typically computationally intractable
for realistic systems. Further complications arise if we consider bankruptcy costs along the lines
of Rogers and Veraart [2013]. Without bankruptcy costs, the 2n default scenarios result in the
partition of the bank endowment space into 2n mutually exclusive and convex regions. However,
in the presence of bankruptcy costs, these partitioned regions are not, in general, convex. We
refer the reader to Appendix A for elucidation of this point. Providing any analytical solution
in this case becomes very challenging even in small systems. Hence a numerical approach has
been generally followed, i.e. via Monte Carlo simulations.
In light of the above, we focus on the setting where the banks have comonotonic endow-
ments. This setting follows from a portfolio optimization perspective. If all firms are portfolio
optimizers, then each will position their endowments to be countermonotonic to the pricing
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kernel (Peleg and Yaari [1975]). Hence the endowments of the banks will be comonotonic to
each other. Furthermore, from a stress testing perspective, a worst case scenario is of particular
importance. We are able to provide a lower bound on the expectation of the system behavior
under any general random endowment with the comonotonic framework; this corresponds with
the risk measure literature in which the riskiest scenario is (often taken as) investing in comono-
tonic portfolios as there would be no benefits from diversification. Under the assumption of
comonotonic endowments, the default regions can be characterized by at most n intervals on
R+ and becomes tractable analytically. This tractability extends to the case where bankruptcy
costs are considered. Thus the comonotonic setting allows us to explore the network effects from
an analytical perspective. In particular, we highlight the closed-form expressions for the price of
debt and market capitalization in the case where the firms invest in a risk-free bond and a risky
asset following a geometric Brownian motion. We wish to note the comparison of this setting
to that taken by Merton [1974].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a description of
our mathematical setting. Section 3.1 considers network clearing when firms have comonotonic
endowments. We provide the expectation of the equilibrium payments, equity, and wealth.
Further, we prove that these expected values can provide lower bounds for the general random
endowment setting of, e.g., Gouriéroux et al. [2012]. Section 3.2 considers the special case where
the firms invest in a risk-free bond and a common risky asset following a geometric Brownian
motion as in Merton [1974]. We provide the explicit solutions for the risk neutral price of debt,
the market capitalization, and the survival probability. Section 4 considers simple comparative
statics of the provided valuations with respect to the different system parameters. Section 5
concludes.
2 Setting
We begin with some simple notation that will be consistent for the entirety of this paper. Let
x, y ∈ Rn for some positive integer n, then
x ∧ y = (min(x1, y1),min(x2, y2), . . . ,min(xn, yn))⊤ ,
x− = −(x ∧ 0), and x+ = (−x)−. Further, to ease notation, we will denote [x, y] := [x1, y1] ×
[x2, y2]× . . .× [xn, yn] ⊆ Rn to be the n-dimensional compact interval for y−x ∈ Rn+. Similarly,
we will consider x ≤ y if and only if y − x ∈ Rn+. We will also make wide use of the vectors
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ej ∈ {0, 1}n for j = 1, 2, ..., n. This vector is defined so that ej has a 1 in its jth element and 0
in all other elements.
Throughout this paper we will consider a network of n financial institutions. Often we will
consider an additional node n+1, which encompasses the entirety of the financial system outside
of the n banks; this node n+ 1 will also be referred to as society or the societal node. We refer
to Feinstein et al. [2017], Glasserman and Young [2015] for further discussion of the meaning
and concepts behind the societal node.
In this paper, we consider obligations with a single maturity date, as considered in Eisenberg and Noe
[2001]. Any bank i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} may have obligations Lij ≥ 0 to any other firm or society
j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n + 1}. We will assume that no firm has any obligations to itself, i.e., Lii = 0
for all firms i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, and the society node has no liabilities at all, i.e., Ln+1,j = 0 for
all firms j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n + 1}. Thus the total liabilities for bank i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} is given by
p¯i :=
∑n+1
j=1 Lij ≥ 0 and relative liabilities from bank i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} to bank j ∈ {1, 2, ..., j} is
given by πij :=
Lij
p¯i
if p¯i > 0 and arbitrary otherwise; for simplicity, in the case that p¯i = 0,
we will let πij = 0 for all j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. Note that, for any firm i, we recover the property
that
∑n
j=1 πij ≤ 1. Throughout this work we will consider the square matrix Π ∈ [0, 1]n×n; the
relative liabilities from firm i to the societal node n+1 can be defined as being 1−∑nj=1 πij ≥ 0.
On the other side of the balance sheet, all firms are assumed to begin with some endowments
xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
The central question explored in the network models is the determination of the firm wealths
after network clearing. Let the clearing wealths be given by V ∈ Rn. In this paper to deter-
mine the clearing wealths, we assume the following stylized rules, in adherence to the standard
literature, i.e. Eisenberg and Noe [2001], Rogers and Veraart [2013]:
(i) Limited liabilities: the total payment made by any firm will never exceed the total assets
available to the bank.
(ii) Priority of debt claims: the shareholders of a firm receive no value unless all its debts are
paid in full.
(iii) All debts are of the same seniority: in case a bank defaults, debts are paid out in proportion
to the size of the nominal claims.
Throughout this work we consider a system with some exogenous recovery rate in case of default,
i.e. a special case of Rogers and Veraart [2013]. This means if bank i has negative wealth Vi < 0
then it is defaulting and its assets are reduced with recovery rate β ∈ [0, 1].
With the rules set, we formalize the clearing process Ψ : Rn → Rn in wealths to de-
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scribe this system. We refer to Veraart [2017], Barucca et al. [2016], Banerjee et al. [2018],
Banerjee and Feinstein [2018] for detailed discussion of the clearing wealths and their relation to
the more typical clearing payments from Eisenberg and Noe [2001], Rogers and Veraart [2013].
As in Banerjee et al. [2018], we can define the payments and equity from the wealths V as
p = (p¯− V −)+ and E = V + respectively. The clearing process is defined for all firms i as
Ψi(V ) := I{Vi≥0}
xi + n∑
j=1
πji(p¯j − V −j )+ − p¯i

+ I{Vi<0}
β
xi + n∑
j=1
πji(p¯j − V −j )+
− p¯i
 .
(1)
As such, the clearing procedure Ψ implies: if bank i has nonnegative wealth Vi ≥ 0 then it is
solvent and its wealth is equal to its total assets minus its total liabilities; if bank i has negative
wealth Vi < 0 then it is defaulting and its assets are reduced by the recovery rate β. We note
that with β = 1 (i.e. under no bankruptcy costs) we recover the model of Eisenberg and Noe
[2001].
We will now consider existence and uniqueness results on the clearing wealth V . In general,
we can get existence by applying Tarski’s fixed point theorem.
Proposition 2.1. There exists a greatest and least clearing solution to V = Ψ(V ) for V ∈ Rn
and any finite clearing solution falls within the lattice [−p¯, x+Π⊤p¯− p¯].
Proof. First note that Ψ is nondecreasing in wealths V . Now we will prove that −p¯ ≤ V ≤
x+Π⊤p¯− p¯ for any V = Ψ(V ) ∈ Rn.
• For any bank i: Vi ≥ I{Vi≥0}[−p¯i] + I{Vi<0}[−p¯i] = −p¯i by construction.
• By monotonicity of the clearing procedure we recover V ≤ Ψ(V +) = x+Π⊤p¯− p¯.
The proof is completed by an application of Tarski’s fixed point theorem on the lattice [−p¯, x+
Π⊤p¯− p¯].
In general, however, the clearing wealth V is not unique. In the special case without
bankruptcy costs (β = 1), this reduces to the network described in Eisenberg and Noe [2001].
In that setting we can get uniqueness under very mild assumptions.
Corollary 2.2. Consider a setting with no bankruptcy costs (β = 1) and all firms have obliga-
tions to the societal node n + 1 (i.e.
∑n
j=1 πij < 1 for all firms i), then there exists a unique
clearing solution V = Ψ(V ).
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Proof. The external node n + 1 implies the system is a regular network [Eisenberg and Noe,
2001, Definition 5]. Thus by Theorem 2 of Eisenberg and Noe [2001] we recover the uniqueness
of the clearing solution.
Assumption 2.3. For the remainder of this paper we will assume that all firms have obligations
to the societal node n+ 1 (i.e.
∑n
j=1 πij < 1 for all firms i).
Proposition 2.4. Let V ↑ = Ψ(V ↑) denote the greatest clearing solution from Proposition 2.1.
Then V ↑ = Ψ∗(V ↑) and is the greatest real-valued fixed point of Ψ∗ where:
Ψ∗i (V ) := I{Vi≥0}
xi + n∑
j=1
πji(p¯j − V −j )− p¯i

+ I{Vi<0}
β
xi + n∑
j=1
πji(p¯j − V −j )
 − p¯i
 .
(2)
Proof. By Proposition 2.1, V ↑ ≥ −p¯ and thus V ↑ = Ψ∗(V ↑) as well. Similarly to the proof of
Proposition 2.1, we can apply Tarski’s fixed point theorem to (2) on the lattice [−∞, x+Π⊤p¯−p¯].
Let V ∗ = Ψ∗(V ∗) be the greatest real-valued fixed point of Ψ∗ and assume V ∗ ≥ V ↑ with
V ∗i > V
↑
i for some bank i. Then it must follow that V
∗ ≥ V ↑ ≥ −p¯, which implies V ∗ = Ψ(V ∗).
However this is a contradiction to V ↑ being the greatest clearing solution to Ψ.
We can compute the maximal clearing solution, as discussed in the previous proposition,
through an application of the fictitious default algorithm as described in Rogers and Veraart
[2013].
Corollary 2.5. The following algorithm converges to the maximal clearing solution V ↑ =
Ψ(V ↑):
(i) Initialize V (0) = x+Π⊤p¯− p¯, z(0) = 0 ∈ Rn, and k = 0.
(ii) Iterate k = k + 1 and define z(k) = I{V (k−1)<0} ∈ {0, 1}n.
(iii) If z(k) = z(k−1) then V ↑ = V (k−1) and terminate.
(iv) Define Λ = diag(z(k)) to be the diagonal matrix with main diagonal defined by z(k) and
V (k) = (I − Λ)
[
x+Π⊤p¯+Π⊤ΛV (k) − p¯
]
+ Λ
[
β
(
x+Π⊤p¯+Π⊤ΛV (k)
)
− p¯
]
=
(
I − (I − (1− β)Λ)Π⊤Λ)−1 [(I − (1− β)Λ) (x+Π⊤p¯)− p¯] .
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(v) Go to step (ii).
Proof. The convergence of this algorithm to the greatest clearing wealth solution follows from
the logic of the fictitious default algorithm in Eisenberg and Noe [2001]. The nonsingularity of
the matrix I−(I−(1−β)Λ)Π⊤Λ follows from input-output results as detailed in [Feinstein et al.,
2018, Theorem 2.6].
Throughout this work we will focus on the greatest clearing wealths solution V ↑. We choose
this equilibrium as all firms and regulators, if given the choice, would prefer these clearing
wealths to all others as no firm can improve on their performance beyond that given by V ↑. We
wish to note that if a different clearing solution were chosen, and in particular the least clearing
wealths, all subsequent results of this paper would follow comparably.
Definition 2.6. Define the mapping V : Rn+ → Rn so that V (x) is the maximal clearing
wealth solution under endowments x ∈ Rn+. Further, define x 7→ p(x) := p¯ − V (x)− and
x 7→ E(x) := V (x)+ to be the associated payments and equity.
Proposition 2.7. The greatest clearing wealth mapping V , and thus also the payment and
equity mappings p and E, is nondecreasing in the endowments x.
Proof. The monotonicity of the clearing wealths in the endowments follow from Theorem 3
of Milgrom and Roberts [1994]. The results for the payments and equity follow directly from
the definition of those mappings from the clearing wealths.
From Corollary 2.5 we are able to give a linear construction for the clearing vector provided
the defaulting set is known. This is given by the following construction. We compare this
linear structure to the directional derivative proposed in Liu and Staum [2010] and the “network
multipliers” from Chen et al. [2016] when considering only the model of Eisenberg and Noe
[2001], i.e. with full recovery (β = 1). For the remainder of this paper we will use the following
definitions:
∆(z) :=
(
I − (I − (1− β) diag(z))Π⊤ diag(z))−1 (I − (1− β) diag(z)) (3)
δ¯(z) :=
(
I − (I − (1− β) diag(z))Π⊤ diag(z))−1 [I − (I − (1− β) diag(z))Π⊤] p¯ (4)
for z ∈ {0, 1}n denoting the set of defaulting institutions as in the fictitious default algorithm
above. Thus
V (x) := ∆(I{V (x)<0})x− δ¯(I{V (x)<0})
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for any endowment x ∈ Rn+ by construction.
3 Expectations and pricing of debt and equity
Consider now a probability space (Ω,F ,P). Denote by L0 := L0(Ω,F ,P) all measurable ran-
dom variables. Further, denote by L1 ⊆ L0 those random variables that have finite absolute
expectation, i.e. X ∈ L1 if X is (Ω,F ,P) measurable and E[|X |] < ∞. Further we will denote
by L1+ those random variables that are almost surely nonnegative.
We note, first, that the problem of finding the expectation of the clearing wealths and
payments under random endowments X ∈ (L1+)n was considered in Gouriéroux et al. [2012]
in the case of no bankruptcy costs (β = 1) but with cross-ownership. We replicate those
results and extend them to consider the case with bankruptcy costs in Appendix A. As finding
the expectations in such a general setting requires computing the measure of 2n regions in
Rn, this would typically require Monte Carlo simulation and suffer greatly from the curse of
dimensionality. Furthermore, if all firms are portfolio optimizers and do not take any other
firm’s investments into account, the chosen endowments will all be countermonotonic to the
pricing kernel (see, e.g., Peleg and Yaari [1975]). As such, a general endowment space is not
necessary for understanding systemic risk and financial contagion. This motivates us to consider
comonotonic endowments as these are often tractable analytically and require the consideration
of at most n intervals. In fact, we will demonstrate that, in the setting of Eisenberg and Noe
[2001], we are able to provide a bound on the expectation of the system behavior under any
random endowment using the comonotonic setting. We will present below, first, the expectations
and probability distributions under general comonotonic endowments and, second, a special case
related to Merton’s model for credit pricing (Merton [1974]). We wish to emphasize that in
this paper, we consider a single maturity model along the lines of Eisenberg and Noe [2001],
Rogers and Veraart [2013], i.e. the network is formed and fixed at time 0 and all claims mature
(and solvency is determined) at time T > 0.
3.1 Expectations under comonotonic endowments
In this section we will consider the endowments to be random and comonotonic. As such, we
wish to recall a definition of comonotonicity of random variables which comes from Proposition
7.18 of McNeil et al. [2015].
Definition 3.1. X ∈ (L1)n is comonotonic if X (d)= f(q) (i.e. equal in distribution) for some
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random variable q ∈ L0 and f : R→ Rn nondecreasing.
Assumption 3.2. Throughout this work we will restrict our consideration to comonotonic non-
negative random vectors of endowments X ∈ (L1+)n that are equal in distribution to f(q) for
some nonnegative random variable q ∈ L0+ and nondecreasing map f : R+ → Rn+.
For any random endowment satisfying Assumption 3.2, we can now consider the defaulting
regions, i.e. the regions in which different combinations of banks are deemed to be defaulting
on a portion of their liabilities. In fact, under the comonotonic setup considered herein, all
such regions in the q-space must be convex intervals in R+. This is in contrast to a general
endowment space in which the regions need not be convex if the recovery rate is strictly less
than 1 (β < 1); we refer to Gouriéroux et al. [2012] and Appendix A for more on this analysis.
Thus, with the comonotonicity assumption we can uniquely define the regions of q under which
different firms default, which we will do so with the vector q∗ ∈ Rn+.
Definition 3.3. Fix some random endowments satisfying Assumption 3.2. Define q∗ ∈ Rn+ so
that q∗i is the minimal value such that firm i is solvent, i.e.
q∗i = inf {q ≥ 0 | Vi(f(q)) ≥ 0} .
Assumption 3.4. Without loss of generality we will assume for the remainder of this paper
(except where explicitly mentioned otherwise) that the banks are placed in descending order of
q∗, i.e. so that q∗1 ≥ q∗2 ≥ ... ≥ q∗n. Additionally, define q∗0 =∞ and q∗n+1 = 0.
Thus the value q∗i is, in some sense, indicative of the financial stability of bank i. Imme-
diately with this construction of minimal values q∗ for which each firm is solvent, we are able
to deduce formulations for the defaulting probabilities for each bank as well as the expecta-
tions of the wealth, payments, and equity for each firm. In contrast to the general formulation
in Gouriéroux et al. [2012] which requires a partition of the endowment space into 2n defaulting
regions, the formulations given in the below theorem require only a partition into n intervals.
Further, as demonstrated in Lemma 3.7 below, in the setting of Eisenberg and Noe [2001], this
formulation provides a tractable bound on the general expectations given in, e.g., Gouriéroux et al.
[2012], Barucca et al. [2016] for large networks.
Theorem 3.5. Let the endowments be defined by X ∈ (L1+)n satisfying Assumption 3.2. The
probability of default, the expected wealth, the expected payment, and the expected equity for firm
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i are given, respectively, by:
P(Vi(X) < 0) = P(q < q
∗
i )
E[Vi(X)] = e
⊤
i
n∑
k=0
[
∆kE[f(q)I{q∈[q∗
k+1,q
∗
k
)}]− δ¯kP(q ∈ [q∗k+1, q∗k))
]
E[pi(X)] = p¯i + e
⊤
i
n∑
k=i
[
∆kE[f(q)I{q∈[q∗
k+1,q
∗
k
)}]− δ¯kP(q ∈ [q∗k+1, q∗k))
]
E[Ei(X)] = e
⊤
i
i−1∑
k=0
[
∆kE[f(q)I{q∈[q∗
k+1,q
∗
k
)}]− δ¯kP(q ∈ [q∗k+1, q∗k))
]
where we define ∆k and δ¯k by:
∆k :=

∆
(∑k
j=1 ej
)
if k = 1, 2, ..., n
I if k = 0
and δ¯k :=

δ¯
(∑k
j=1 ej
)
if k = 1, ..., n
(I −Π⊤)p¯ if k = 0
.
Proof. This follows directly from the construction of V in the fictitious default algorithm of
Corollary 2.5 and the construction of q∗.
Remark 3.6. We will now compare the expectation results above to those from Gouriéroux et al.
[2012] with cross-ownership of equity but no bankruptcy costs. In this setting the ownership of
equity is denoted by Γ ∈ [0, 1]n×n where bank j owns γij of bank i’s equity. Under the assump-
tion that no firm has sold off all of its equity, we consider only the case that
∑n
j=1 γij < 1. We
can consider this setting in the same way by redefining ∆, δ¯ as:
∆(z) :=
(
I − (I − (1 − β) diag(z)) [Π⊤ diag(z) + Γ⊤(I − diag(z))])−1
× (I − (1− β) diag(z))
δ¯(z) :=
(
I − (I − (1 − β) diag(z)) [Π⊤ diag(z) + Γ⊤(I − diag(z))])−1
× [I − (I − (1− β) diag(z))Π⊤] p¯.
The comonotonic case that we consider would, as discussed previously, solve the curse of dimen-
sionality issue that exists in the work of Gouriéroux et al. [2012].
In the equations for the expectations of the wealth, payments, and equity, the terms E[f(q)I{q∈[q∗
k+1,q
∗
k
)}]
appear for different k = 0, 1, ..., n. We note that these terms will often require Monte Carlo simu-
lation to compute. In the next section we will consider a special case of the random endowments
under which this term can be determined analytically.
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We now wish to consider how the formulas above for the expectations of wealth and debt
under comonotonic endowments can provide a bound for the more general random endowments.
As previously mentioned, the expectations of debt and equity were studied in Gouriéroux et al.
[2012], Barucca et al. [2016], but the formulations required suffer from the curse of dimension-
ality. More generally, if the correlations between firm endowments is unknown, the following
lemma is useful from a stress-test viewpoint as we find that the comonotonic case is a lower
bound on the health of the system.
Lemma 3.7. Consider the setting of Eisenberg and Noe [2001], i.e. β = 1. Let X ∈ (L1+)n and
Z = (F−1X1 (U), ..., F
−1
Xn
(U)) for uniform random variable U on the support [0, 1] and marginal
distributions FX1 , ..., FXn for X1, ..., Xn respectively. Then E[Vi(X)] ≥ E[Vi(Z)] and E[pi(X)] ≥
E[pi(Z)] for any bank i.
Proof. By construction X ≤sm Z with respect to the supermodular order (see Section 9.A.4
and, in particular, Theorem 9.A.21 of Shaked and Shanthikumar [2007]). We further note that,
under the setting of Eisenberg and Noe [2001], we can consider this system as a fixed point in
the payments p(x) = p¯ ∧ (x + Π⊤p(x)) with V (x) = x + Π⊤p(x) − p¯. Thus if p : Rn+ → [0, p¯]
is submodular then the result is proven. To prove this result we consider that the payment
function is the pointwise limit of the mappings pk : Rn+ → [0, p¯] defined iteratively as:
p0(x) := p¯ and pk+1(x) := p¯ ∧ (x +Π⊤pk(x)) ∀k ∈ N, ∀x ∈ Rn+.
As p(x) = limk→∞ pk(x) by construction (where convergence follows from the monotonicity and
boundedness of the arguments 0 ≤ pk+1(x) ≤ pk(x)), if pk is submodular for all k then the same
must be true for the clearing payments p. Trivially p0 is submodular. Now by induction assume
that pk−1 is submodular. Take x, y ∈ Rn+ and i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}; there are three cases that must
be considered:
(i) If pki (x) = p
k
i (y) = p¯i then p
k
i (x) + p
k
i (y) ≥ pki (x ∧ y) + pki (x ∨ y) by construction.
(ii) If pki (x) < p
k
i (y) = p¯i then p
k
i (x) ≥ pki (x ∧ y) and pki (y) = pki (x ∨ y) by monotonicity
(Proposition 2.7); thus pki (x) + p
k
i (y) ≥ pki (x ∧ y) + pki (x ∨ y).
(iii) If pki (x) < p¯i and p
k
i (y) < p¯i then p
k
i (x) = xi +
∑n
j=1 πjip
k−1
j (x) and p
k
i (y) = yi +∑n
j=1 πjip
k−1
j (y). Therefore we find
pki (x) + p
k
i (y) =
xi + n∑
j=1
πjip
k−1
j (x)
 +
yi + n∑
j=1
πjip
k−1
j (y)

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= xi + yi +
n∑
j=1
πji
[
pk−1j (x) + p
k−1
j (y)
]
≥ xi ∧ yi + xi ∨ yi +
n∑
j=1
πji
[
pk−1j (x ∧ y) + pk−1j (x ∨ y)
]
=
(x ∧ y)i + n∑
j=1
πjip
k−1
j (x ∧ y)
+
(x ∨ y)i + n∑
j=1
πjip
k−1
j (x ∨ y)

≥ pki (x ∧ y) + pki (x ∨ y).
In the below simple network, we demonstrate some counterexamples to extending the results
of Lemma 3.7. For instance, we first consider the setting with bankruptcy costs, i.e. with recovery
rate β < 1. Second we demonstrate that, even in the Eisenberg-Noe setting, no consistent
bounds for firm equity exists. Intriguingly, though the payments and wealth attain their worst-
case under comonotonic endowments, the equity of the different firms in the financial system
may actually be higher under the comonotonic endowments than other correlation structures.
However, we wish to note that the societal node would exhibit the same lower bound property
as given in Lemma 3.7 since its equity is equal to its wealth by construction.
Example 3.8. We wish to consider the cases not proven to have bounds in Lemma 3.7 above.
Specifically, we will demonstrate that the bounds do not hold when bankruptcy costs exist
(β < 1) and that the equity does not satisfy the bounding property with comonotonicity. For
these counterexamples we will consider the 2 bank and societal node system depicted in Figure 1.
That is, firm 1 owes 1 to both firm 2 and the societal node and firm 2 owes 1 to firm 1 and 2 to
the societal node.
Bank 1 Bank 2Societal 3
L13 = 1
L23 = 2
L12 = 1
L21 = 1
Figure 1: Example 3.8: A sample network topology used to determine counterexamples to expand-
ing the results of Lemma 3.7.
• First, we wish to consider a counterexample to the bounds provided in Lemma 3.7 for a
network with bankruptcy costs (β < 1). Consider the countermonotonic and comonotonic
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random endowments (including for the societal node 3)
X =

(0, 2, 0) with P(X = (0, 2, 0)) = 12
(1, 0, 0) with P(X = (1, 0, 0)) = 12
Z =

(0, 0, 0) with P(Z = (0, 0, 0)) = 12
(1, 2, 0) with P(Z = (1, 2, 0)) = 12
.
With recovery rate β ∈ [0, 1] we find that the four possible payment vectors are:
p((0, 0, 0)) = (0, 0, 0)
p((0, 2, 0)) =
(
4β2
6− β2 ,
12β
6− β2 , 0
)
p((1, 0, 0)) =
(
6β
6− β2 ,
3β2
6− β2 , 0
)
p((1, 2, 0)) = (2, 3, 0).
Thus we can conclude
E[p(X)] =
(
β(2β + 3)
6− β2 ,
3β(β + 4)
2(6− β2) , 0
)
≤
(
1,
3
2
, 0
)
= E[p(Z)].
In fact E[pi(X)] < E[pi(Z)], and thus also E[Vi(X)] < E[Vi(Z)], for both firms i if β ∈ [0, 1).
• Second, we wish to consider a counterexample to a bound for the equity. Again we will
consider two simple random endowments
X =

(1 + ǫ, 2, 0) with P(X = (1 + ǫ, 2, 0)) = 12
(2, 1 + ǫ, 0) with P(X = (2, 1 + ǫ, 0)) = 12
Z =

(1 + ǫ, 1 + ǫ, 0) with P(Z = (1 + ǫ, 1 + ǫ, 0)) = 12
(2, 2, 0) with P(Z = (2, 2, 0)) = 12
with ǫ ∈ (0, 14 ). We find that the four possible payment and equity vectors are:
p((1 + ǫ, 1 + ǫ, 0)) =
(
8
5
(1 + ǫ) ,
9
5
(1 + ǫ) , 0
)
p((1 + ǫ, 2, 0)) = (2, 3, 0)
p((2, 1 + ǫ, 0)) = (2, 2 + ǫ, 0)
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p((2, 2, 0)) = (2, 3, 0).
Thus we can conclude from E(x) = x+Π⊤p(x) − p(x) that
E[E(X)] =
(
1 + 2ǫ
3
, 0 ,
8 + ǫ
3
)
E[E(Z)] =
(
1
2
, 0 ,
5
2
+ ǫ
)
.
Notably we find that we cannot compare E[E(X)] and E[E(Z)] since E[E1(X)] < E[E1(Z)]
but E[E3(X)] > E[E3(Z)].
3.2 Pricing under geometric Brownian motion with common noise
In this section we will consider a specific case of the comonotonic structure. Here we consider
a market with a risk-free bond and a single risky asset in which the different firms have het-
erogeneous investments. The risky asset, which can be viewed as an investment in the market
portfolio, will be assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion. This setting is chosen for
the purposes of comparison to Merton [1974]. Due to the heterogeneity of portfolios, but with a
common risky asset, this system can be considered equivalent to a vector of geometric Brownian
motions with differing volatilities but a single common noise term.
Assumption 3.9. Let r ≥ 0 be the risk-free rate. Let b, s ∈ Rn+ denote the investments of
the firms in the risk-free bond and in a risky asset. Consider a terminal time T > 0. Define
X = f(qT ) := be
rT + sqT almost surely where
dqt
qt
= µdt+ σdWt
for Brownian motion W and with initial price of the risky asset q0 > 0.
We wish to compare this setting to the single firm setting proposed in Merton [1974] in which
the assets of a firm follow a geometric Brownian motion and the pricing of debt and equity is
considered. We note that the comonotonic construction from the prior section would allow us
to consider more complicated underlying market models, e.g. a jump diffusion model. But for
simplicity and due to its use in the seminal work by Merton, we will restrict ourselves to the
geometric Brownian motion setting herein.
With the setting proposed in Assumption 3.9 we can explicitly give an iterative representation
for the lowest prices q∗ ∈ Rn+ such that each firm is solvent. We note that this construction does
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not rely on Assumption 3.4.
Proposition 3.10. The lowest prices such that the various firms are solvent, defined by q∗ in
Definition 3.3, can be defined explicitly by the following iterative relation of decreasing values.
Initialize q∗[0] =∞ and z(0) = 0 ∈ Rn. Then for any k = 1, 2, ..., n:
[k] ∈ argmax
i: z
(k−1)
i
=0
[
e⊤i diag(∆(z
(k−1))s)−1
(
δ¯(z(k−1))−∆(z(k−1))−1berT
)]+
q∗[k] := min
{
q∗[k−1] , max
i: z
(k−1)
i
=0
[
e⊤i diag(∆(z
(k−1))s)−1
(
δ¯(z(k−1))−∆(z(k−1))−1berT
)]+}
z(k) := z(k−1) + e[k].
If the maximizing argument in the definition of [k] is non-unique, then only a single argument
is chosen arbitrarily.
Proof. This follows directly from the monotonicity of the wealths as given in Proposition 2.7
and the construction of ∆, δ¯ in (3) and (4). The level q∗[k] is chosen exactly to be the largest price
q so that the [k]th bank would have 0 wealth (i.e. the lowest price so that it is solvent) given that
the prior [1] through [k − 1] banks have already been deemed insolvent. The minimum taken
with q∗[k−1] is necessary only in the case of contagious defaults, i.e. from bankruptcy costs if the
jump in payments from bank [k− 1] causes bank [k] to also become insolvent at the same time.
We wish to note that, if e⊤i ∆(z)s = 0 for some z ∈ {0, 1}n, we take 1/(e⊤i ∆(z)s) = ∞. This
can only occur if firm i holds no risky assets (si = 0) and all firms j with obligations to firm i
(Lji > 0) either are solvent (zj = 0) or hold no risky assets (sj = 0), i.e. if firm i’s solvency is
independent from the behavior of the risky asset under the default set z.
For the remainder of this paper we will consider Assumption 3.4 to hold, i.e. q∗1 ≥ ... ≥ q∗n.
This is for simplicity of notation and does not restrict the results of this work. With this
construction we now present a corollary to Theorem 3.5 to provide the risk-neutral price of
debt and value of the market capitalization for the firms in the financial system in this common
investment scenario. These formulations are analytical expressions with respect to the vector
q∗ which was algorithmically provided in Proposition 3.10.
Corollary 3.11. Let Q be the risk-neutral measure in the market, i.e.
dQ
dP
= exp
(
−1
2
(
µ− r
σ
)2
T −
(
µ− r
σ
)
WT
)
.
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Under the risk-neutral measure Q, the probability of firm i’s default Q(Vi(X) < 0), the discounted
price of firm i’s debt EQ[e−rTpi(X)/p¯i], and firm i’s market capitalization EQ[e−rTEi(X)] are
given by:
Q(Vi(X) < 0) = Φ
(−d2i ) (5)
EQ
[
e−rT
pi(X)
p¯i
]
= e−rT +
1
p¯i
e⊤i
n∑
k=i
[(
∆kb− e−rT δ¯k
) [
Φ
(−d2k)− Φ (−d2k+1)]
+∆ksq0
[
Φ
(−d1k)− Φ (−d1k+1)]]
(6)
EQ[e−rTEi(X)] = e
⊤
i
i−1∑
k=0
[(
∆kb− e−rT δ¯k
) [
Φ
(−d2k)− Φ (−d2k+1)]
+∆ksq0
[
Φ
(−d1k)− Φ (−d1k+1)]]
(7)
d1k =
log( q0
q∗
k
) + (r + 12σ
2)T
σ
√
T
∀k = 0, 1, ..., n+ 1 (8)
d2 = d1 − σ
√
T (9)
where Φ : R→ [0, 1] is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 3.5. Particularly,
EQ[e−rT (berT + sqT )I{qT∈[q∗k+1,q∗k)}] = bQ(qT ∈ [q∗k+1, q∗k)) + sq0Q̂(qT ∈ [q∗k+1, q∗k))
where dQ̂
dQ =
e−rT qT
q0
. In fact, we can explicitly provide these probabilities by, first, noting that
W Q̂t = W
Q
t − σt is a Brownian motion under Q̂. Therefore, letting Z and Zˆ follow a normal
distribution under Q and Q̂ respectively, for any q¯ ≥ 0:
Q(qT ≤ q¯) = Q(q0 exp((r − 1
2
σ2)T + σ
√
TZ) ≤ q¯) = Φ
(
− log(q0/q¯) + (r −
1
2σ
2)T
σ
√
T
)
,
Q̂(qT ≤ q¯) = Q̂(q0 exp((r + 1
2
σ2)T + σ
√
TZˆ) ≤ q¯) = Φ
(
− log(q0/q¯) + (r +
1
2σ
2)T
σ
√
T
)
.
Remark 3.12. As an external investor may wish to hedge her counterparty risk, we wish to
consider the Greeks for debt for firm i. In particular, from a pricing and hedging perspective, we
find the delta of the debt in a financial network as the most interesting. By direct computation
we find that, for the price process Pi(t) := EQ[e−r(T−t)pi(X)/p¯i | Ft], the delta at time t is
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given by:
∂Pi(t)
∂q
=
1
p¯iqtσ
√
T − te
⊤
i
n∑
k=i
[(
e−r(T−t)δ¯ −∆kbert
) [
φ(−d1k)− φ(−d2k+1)
]
+ (∆ks)
[(
Φ(−d2k)− Φ(−d2k+1)
)− qt (φ(−d2k)− φ(−d2k+1))] ]
d1k =
log( qt
q∗
k
) + (r + 12σ
2)(T − t)
σ
√
T − t ∀k = 0, 1, ..., n+ 1
d2 = d1 − σ
√
T − t.
In the above formulation we define φ = Φ′ as the standard normal probability density function.
In a similar way we can compute the other Greeks.
Under this geometric Brownian motion setting we are able to provide the explicit distribution
for the wealths (and therefore also payments and equity). These joint distributions would be
particularly useful for stress testing a financial system as it would allow the regulatory authority
to assign probabilities to the outcomes of the stress tests. This is more explicitly considered in
the numerous works on systemic risk measures, see e.g. Chen et al. [2013], Kromer et al. [2016],
Feinstein et al. [2017], Biagini et al. [2018], Armenti et al. [2018], in which some “aggregate” of
the financial system needs to be deemed acceptable. This acceptability criterion would com-
monly be constructed from a law-invariant framework, e.g. value-at-risk or expected shortfall,
which explicitly requires the distribution of the system outcomes.
Lemma 3.13. Take v∗ ∈ −p¯+ Rn+, p∗ ∈ [0, p¯], and e∗ ∈ Rn+:
Q(V (X) ≤ v∗) =
n∑
k=0
[
min
{
Φ(−d2k), min
i=1,2,...,n
Φ
(
log(q¯ki (v
∗)/q0)− (r − 12σ2)T
σ
√
T
)}
−min
{
Φ(−d2k+1), min
i=1,2,...,n
Φ
(
log(q¯ki (v
∗)/q0)− (r − 12σ2)T
σ
√
T
)}]
(10)
Q(V (X) ≥ v∗) =
n∑
k=0
[
max
{
Φ(−d2k), max
i=1,2,...,n
Φ
(
log(q¯ki (v
∗)/q0)− (r − 12σ2)T
σ
√
T
)}
−max
{
Φ(−d2k+1), max
i=1,2,...,n
Φ
(
log(q¯ki (v
∗)/q0)− (r − 12σ2)T
σ
√
T
)}]
(11)
Q(p(X) ≤ p∗) = Q(V (X) ≤ diag(I{p∗<p¯})[p∗ − p¯] + I{p∗=p¯}∞) (12)
Q(p(X) ≥ p∗) = Q(V (X) ≥ p∗ − p¯) (13)
Q(E(X) ≤ e∗) = Q(V (X) ≤ e∗) (14)
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Q(E(X) ≥ e∗) = Q(V (X) ≥ e∗) (15)
where q¯ki (v
∗) := e⊤i diag(∆ks)
−1
(
v∗ + δ¯k −∆kberT
)
.
Proof. Consider first the probability distribution for the wealths V given in (10). Take v∗ ∈
−p¯+Rn+ (if v∗ is taken otherwise then Q(V (X) ≤ v∗) = 0 by the bound given in Proposition 2.1).
Q(V (X) ≤ v∗) =
n∑
k=0
Q(V (X) ≤ v∗, qT ∈ [q∗k+1, q∗k))
=
n∑
k=0
Q(∆k[be
rT + sqT ]− δ¯k ≤ v∗, qT ∈ [q∗k+1, q∗k))
=
n∑
k=0
Q(qT ≤ e⊤i diag(∆ks)−1
(
v∗ + δ¯k −∆kberT
) ∀i, qT ∈ [q∗k+1, q∗k))
=
n∑
k=0
Q
(
qT ∈ [min
{
q∗k+1, min
i=1,2,...,n
q¯ki (v
∗)
}
, min
{
q∗k, min
i=1,2,...,n
q¯ki (v
∗)
}
]
)
=
n∑
k=0
[
min
{
Φ(−d2k), min
i=1,2,...,n
Φ
(
log(q¯ki (v
∗)/q0)− (r − 12σ2)T
σ
√
T
)}
−min
{
Φ(−d2k+1), min
i=1,2,...,n
Φ
(
log(q¯ki (v
∗)/q0)− (r − 12σ2)T
σ
√
T
)}]
.
As before, we take 1/(e⊤i ∆ks) =∞ if e⊤i ∆ks = 0. This cannot occur if, by construction of ∆k
for any k, all firms are long the risky asset (s ∈ Rn++). The construction of the explicit form of
the probabilities in the final equation come from the same logic as in the proof of Corollary 3.11
above.
Now consider the survival distribution for the wealths V given in (11). Again take v∗ ∈
−p¯ + Rn+ (if v∗ is taken otherwise then Q(V (X) ≥ v∗) = Q(V (X) ≥ [−p¯] ∧ v∗) by the bound
given in Proposition 2.1). The logic for the representation in (11) follows similarly to that for
the distribution function for wealths given above.
Finally, consider the distribution for the payments p and equity E given in (12)-(15). Take
p∗ ∈ [0, p¯]. We note that p ≤ p¯ + V with equality for any defaulting bank i. Thus we can
conclude:
Q(p(X) ≤ p∗) = Q(pi(X) ≤ p∗i ∀i : p∗i < p¯i)
= Q(Vi(X) ≤ p∗i − p¯i ∀i : p∗i < p¯i)
= Q(V (X) ≤ diag(I{p∗<p¯})[p∗ − p¯] + I{p∗=p¯}∞)
Q(p(X) ≥ p∗) = Q(V (X) ≥ p∗ − p¯).
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Take e∗ ∈ Rn+. Then E ≤ e∗ if and only if V ≤ e∗ and similarly for E ≥ e∗. Thus the result is
proven.
Bank 1
b1 = 0
s1 = 3
Bank 2
b2 = 0
s2 = 4
Societal 3
b3 = 100
s3 = 0
L13 = 3
L23 = 3
L12 = 7
L21 = 3
Figure 2: A simple network topology for Examples 3.14, 3.15, and 4.2.
We wish to conclude this section by providing simple examples to demonstrate the results
considered so far in this paper. Namely, we wish to show the analytical distribution for the
payments from the firms followed by an empirical example showing the bounding properties
first proposed in Lemma 3.7. In both of these examples we will focus on a simple 2 bank
network with societal node as depicted in Figure 2.
Example 3.14. Consider the financial system depicted in Figure 2 under geometric Brownian
motion assets with a common noise. This two bank system with an additional societal node
will be considered with bankruptcy costs described by the recovery rate β = 0.75 and is such
that bank 1 owes 7 units to bank 2 and 3 to the societal node and bank 2 owes 3 units to both
bank 1 and the societal node. Further, for simplicity, the risk-free rate is assumed to be r = 0.
Additionally, the maturity is set so that T = 1 and volatility so that σ = 1. Finally, the initial
price of the risky asset is set to q0 = 1. With this financial system, we will demonstrate the
distributions of the clearing payments under the risk-neutral measure. Figure 3a displays the
cumulative distribution function of the clearing payments as a contour plot. Notably, the joint
cumulative distribution function has fairly stark right-angles in the individual contour lines.
This structure follows from the use of minimums and maximums in the construction of the joint
distribution for the clearing payments. The marginal cumulative distribution function for the
payments from bank 1 is displayed in Figure 3b. The sections over which no probability is
assigned are due to the bankruptcy costs in this setting. Notably, though piecewise similar to
the cumulative distribution function of the lognormal, the marginal distribution clearly exhibits
behavior that can only be found by accounting for the network effects.
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(a) The joint cumulative distribution function of
payments.
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payments from bank 1.
Figure 3: Example 3.14: The probability distribution of the clearing payments of the financial
network provided by Figure 2 under bankruptcy costs.
Finally, we wish to numerically consider the case in which firm assets are correlated log-
normals, but not comonotonic. We will use this numerical example to illustrate the bounding
properties found in Lemma 3.7.
Example 3.15. Consider again the financial system with 2 banks and an additional societal
node presented in Figure 2 and discussed in Example 3.14. Herein we wish to demonstrate
the accuracy of the bounds found in Lemma 3.7 compared with varying correlations between
the risky investments of the two firms. As such we will restrict ourselves to the Eisenberg-Noe
setting without bankruptcy costs (β = 1). To consider assets that are not perfectly correlated
we compute the prices and expected values via Monte Carlo simulations. To construct the
assets of the two banks we consider separate pricing processes for each bank. These pricing
processes follow the correlated geometric Brownian motions with correlations ρ ∈ [−1, 1] under
the risk-neutral measure Q:
dq1t
q1t
= rdt + σdW 1t ,
dq2t
q2t
= rdt + σdW 2t , E
Q[dW 1t dW
2
t ] = ρdt.
We will primarily focus on bank 2 in this example as it has a typical response. We first draw our
attention to Figure 4a. In this figure we see that the price of debt is bounded from below by the
comonotonic case as proven in Lemma 3.7. However, as previously discussed in Example 3.8, the
market capitalization does not need to have its worst-case under the comonotonic asset scenario.
21
In fact, in this example, we find that under the comonotonic scenario the price of debt is lowest
but the market capitalization is at its maximum for bank 2. In contrast, the societal node
finds its equity worth the least when the firms have comonotonic assets. Finally, in Figure 4b
we plot the (risk-neutral) probability of default of bank 2 as a function of asset correlations.
Notably, the comonotonic case provides the greatest probability of default for bank 2, but the
countermonotonic setting is not the lowest probability of default.
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(a) Clearing payments from bank 2 under changes
in asset correlations (solid line) and comonotonic
assets (dashed line).
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Figure 4: Example 3.15: Demonstration of that clearing payments under comonotonic assets provide
a lower bound, but the probability of default is not monotonically increasing in correlation of assets.
4 Comparative statics
In this section we provide the comparative statics for the performance of the system with respect
to important system parameters through numerical examples. In these numerical examples we
will assume the geometric Brownian motion setting of Section 3.2.
Definition 4.1. Define the effective interest rate on firm i’s debt by:
Ri =
1
T
[
log(p¯i)− log(EQ[e−rT pi(X)])
]
.
For bank i, we can define Ri−r as the risk premium along the lines of Merton [1974]. Please
note that the risk premium can be taken as an effective measure of the price of debt.
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Example 4.2. Consider again the financial system with 2 banks and an additional societal
node as depicted in Figure 2 and used in Examples 3.14 and 3.15. Additionally, for simplicity
and where otherwise we are not varying that parameter, we consider the risky asset to have
initial price q0 = 1, volatility σ = 1, and the claims to have maturity at time T = 1. Further,
the risk-free rate is assumed to be r = 0. We consider this simple, illustrative, example so as
to demonstrate the effects of the financial network (in comparison to the same system in two
baseline systems without interbank debt as in Merton [1974]). For a clear comparison we will
take this system without bankruptcy costs (β = 1) and with a common risky asset following a
geometric Brownian motion. Specifically, we will consider the same comparative statics on the
risk premium as undertaken by Merton [1974], i.e. by varying the debt-firm value ratios, the
volatility of the risky asset, and the maturity of the debt claims. Please note that since we have
assumed r = 0 we will use the terms risk premium and effective interest rate interchangeably.
(i) First we will consider the impact of the debt-firm value ratios d = diag
(
b+ sq0 +Π
⊤p¯
)−1
p¯
on the risk premium and thus the price of debt for each firm. In Merton [1974] in which no
firm holds any risk-free assets (bi = 0) nor any interbank assets (
∑n
j=1 πjip¯j = 0), it was
shown that an individual firm’s debt-firm value ratio can completely determine its own
risk premium R − r. However, herein we consider explicitly the effects of the interbank
assets. In our case, we can vary d by either:
(a) altering the liabilities p¯ and keeping endowments b and s constant, i.e.
p¯ =
 1 −π21d1
−π12d2 1
−1  (b1 + s1q0)d1
(b2 + s2q0)d2

given the desired debt-firm value ratio d ∈ R2+ constrained by d1d2 ≤ π12π21; or
(b) altering the assets s and keeping liabilities p¯ constant, i.e.
s = diag(d)−1
[
p¯− diag(d)Π⊤p¯]
given the desired debt-firm value ratio d ∈ R2+ so that d ≤ diag(Π⊤p¯)−1p¯.
The distinction between the two approaches to varying d is important because we find
that the manner in which the debt-firm value ratio is modified can greatly affect the price
of debt as measured by the risk premium. The contour plots of the risk premium of bank
2 with respect to debt-firm 1 value ratio d1 and debt-firm 2 value ratio d2 are shown in
Figure 5a and Figure 5b for varying the debt-firm values by altering liabilities and altering
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assets respectively. To provide further clarity on how the individual debt-firm values affect
each other, we consider three slices of this data, by fixing the level of d1 and varying d2
through either altering the liabilities or the assets in Figure 5c and Figure 5d respectively.
Notably, if firm 1 has a lower debt-firm value ratio d1 constructed through the change
in assets, then firm 2 consistently has a lower effective interest rate for any debt-firm
ratio chosen. However, there is no such monotonicity when the debt-firm value ratios are
constructed through changes in the liabilities.
(ii) Second we will consider the impact of the volatility σ of the risky asset on the risk pre-
mium (and thus the price of debt) and the market capitalization for each firm. In this
consideration we wish to compare the network effects with two baseline models without a
network. In order to consider the system without network effects we consider two settings:
(a) with the assumption that all interbank assets are paid off in full in units of the risk-free
asset; and
(b) with the assumption that all interbank assets are treated no differently than other
risky assets (i.e. following the market geometric Brownian motion and not capped by
the total obligations).
Due to the risk of the interbank assets, and as verified numerically, it is clear that the
risk premium would be lower when neglecting counterparty risk and all interbank assets
are treated as if they are risk-free than in the full networked system. Further, the market
capitalization would be higher when neglecting the network effects and debts are treated
as being paid in full in the risk-free asset. However, when interbank assets are treated
as if they follow the market, the effective interest rates are comparable with the network
effects. In contrast, the equity is significantly higher in this setting as the limited value
that interbank assets can obtain is removed when treated as being an investment in the
market. We display the results for the risk premium and the market capitalization for
firm 1 and firm 2 under the networked system and the two baseline models in Figure 6a
and Figure 6b respectively. As depicted in Figure 6a, firm 1 has greater effective interest
rate when including the network effects or risk; in fact, firm 1 has its highest interest
rates (asymptoting to approximately a 7% higher interest rate) when interbank assets
are treated as risky assets. However, as shown in Figure 6a, firm 1 has equal market
capitalization with network effects and when all interbank assets are treated as being
paid in full; the market capitalization is significantly higher when interbank assets follow
the market geometric Brownian motion. Firm 2, as depicted in Figure 6b, has orders of
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(a) Contour plot of the effective interest rate for
firm 2 under different debt-firm value ratios when
determined by the total liabilities.
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Figure 5: Example 4.2(i): The effective interest rate of firm 2 versus changes in the debt-firm value
ratios.
magnitude higher effective interest rates under the network effects than if they had no
counterparty risk, and highest effective interest rates (asymptoting to approximately an
8% higher interest rate) when full network effects are taken into account. Here the market
capitalization is distinct under all three considerations with the networked effects having
the lowest market capitalization. This distinction makes clear that network effects can and
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should not be neglected when considering the price of debt and market capitalization.
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Figure 6: Example 4.2(ii): The effective interest rate and market capitalization versus changes in
the volatility of the risky asset.
(iii) Finally we will consider the impact of the maturity T for the claims on the risk premium
(and thus the price of debt) and the market capitalization for each firm. As with the
consideration on volatility above, we wish to compare the network effects with two baseline
models without a network. We accomplish this in exactly the same way as considered
previously. Again, due to the risk of the interbank assets in a network, it is clear that the
effective interest rate would be higher and market capitalization lower when including the
network effects than when all interbank assets are treated as in baseline model (iia). As
depicted in Figure 7a, firm 1 has similar effective interest rate in all three scenarios, though
the market capitalization is nearly double when interbank assets are treated as the market
asset (baseline model (iib)). Firm 2, as depicted in Figure 7b, has orders of magnitude
higher effective interest rates under the network effects than if they had no counterparty
risk and noticeably higher effective interest rate when full network effects are taken into
account than if interbank assets are treated no differently than other risky assets (i.e.
following the market model). As with all prior discussions on the market capitalization,
the network effects greatly reduce the market capitalization compared to the two single-
firm scenarios considered herein. We wish to conclude by considering the shapes of the
interest rates as a function of the maturity of the claims under network effects. In Merton
[1974] the hyperbolic shape of firm 1’s effective interest rate would only occur if its debt-
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firm value ratio was greater than or equal to 1; similarly the shape exhibited by firm 2’s
effective interest rate would only occur if its debt-firm value ratio was strictly less than 1.
However, as discussed above, the debt-firm value ratio does not have as unique a property
under network effects as it did in Merton [1974] without counterparty risk. Thus we find
that the change in shape need not (and in this numerical example, does not) change shape
at the individual debt-firm value ratios of 1.
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Figure 7: Example 4.2(iii): The effective interest rate and market capitalization versus changes in
the maturity of the debt claims.
Example 4.3. We will now consider a larger financial network consisting of n = 87 banks. This
large network provides clear reasoning for considering the comonotonic approach taken within
this paper. As previously discussed, with 87 banks, there are 287 > 1026 potential combinations
of defaulting banks z ∈ {0, 1}87. As such, the general framework for considering expected
payments from Gouriéroux et al. [2012] would be computationally intractable. However, the
comonotonic framework presented herein (and which, under the setting of Eisenberg and Noe
[2001], provides a worst-case for the general setting) is computationally tractable as only 87
defaulting regions need to be considered.
For this example, we will consider these 87 banks to come from the 2011 European Banking
Authority EU-wide stress tests.1 This dataset has been used in multiple prior empirical case
studies (e.g. Gandy and Veraart [2016], Chen et al. [2016]) of financial contagion in interbank
1Due to complications with the calibration methodology, we only consider 87 of the 90 institutions. DE029, LU45,
and SI058 were not included in this analysis.
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networks. To calibrate this system, we will take the same approach from Feinstein [2018].
We note, however, that though we are calibrating the financial network to a real dataset, the
marginal distribution for bank endowments are not calibrated and as such this example is for
illustrative purposes only. We believe that there would be significant value in a further, detailed,
case study to empirically determine the marginal distributions of the bank endowments and,
with that result, consider yield rates and bond prices to compare with the realized prices in
the market. This is, however, beyond the scope of the current example. In fact, the primary
purpose of using this dataset in this example, as opposed to a large fictional network, is to
demonstrate the order of magnitude that the price of debt and effective interest rates can
achieve (in comparison to the values presented in the prior case studies on the 2 bank system).
For this network calibration, we consider a stylized balance sheet for each bank. We consider
banks with only two types of assets: interbank assets
∑n
j=1 Lji and external (risky) assets si.
Similarly, we consider three types of liabilities for each bank: interbank liabilities
∑n
j=1 Lij ,
external liabilities Li,n+1, and capital Ci. In contrast, the EBA dataset provides the total assets
Ai, capital Ci, and interbank liabilities
∑n
j=1 Lij for each bank i.
Therefore, to calibrate our interbank network, we will need to make a few simplifying assump-
tions and take advantage of techniques from prior literature. In particular, as in Feinstein [2018],
Chen et al. [2016], Glasserman and Young [2015], the external (risky) assets are the difference
between the total assets and interbank assets, the external obligations (owed to the societal
node Li,n+1) are equal to the total liabilities less the interbank liabilities and capital, and the
interbank assets will be assumed equal to the interbank liabilities, i.e.,
∑n
j=1 Lij =
∑n
j=1 Lji
for all banks i. Thus, we can construct the remainder of our stylized balance sheet through the
system of equations
si = Ai −
n∑
j=1
Lij , Li0 = Ai −
n∑
j=1
Lij − Ci, p¯i = Li0 +
n∑
j=1
Lij .
To verify the consistency of this calibration, we note that firm i’s net worth is equal to its
capital, i.e., Ci = Ai − p¯i.
Finally, for our calibration, we need to consider the full nominal liabilities matrix L ∈ R87×87+
and not just the total interbank assets and liabilities. In order to accomplish this task we consider
the methodology of Gandy and Veraart [2016]. That paper presents an MCMC methodology to
construct the nominal liabilities matrix consistent with the total interbank assets and liabilities
and which allows for a (randomized) sparsity structure. As noted previously, this example is for
illustrative purposes only and thus we will consider only a single calibration of the interbank
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network.
In order to complete our model, we need to consider the remaining parameters of the system.
First, as all economic data pulled from the EBA EU-wide stress test dataset are already in a
consistent unit (millions of euros), we will consider q0 = 1 (million). Further, during the period
over which this data was collected, central banks were setting a low interest rate environment.
Therefore we estimate that the risk-free interest rate is r = 0. Additionally, as this is data from a
single year’s stress test, we will consider maturity on all debt claims to be T = 1 (year). Finally,
the volatility of the risky asset is estimated to be σ = 20% from comparisons to annualized
historical volatility of European markets in 2011.
First, we wish to consider the impact of the full network effects on the effective interest rates
and market capitalization in the setting without bankruptcy costs (β = 1). For this analysis we
consider the same two baseline models as in Example 4.2 above, i.e.
(i) with the assumption that all interbank assets are paid off in full in units of the risk-free
asset; and
(ii) with the assumption that all interbank assets are treated no differently than other risky
assets (i.e. following the market geometric Brownian motion and not capped by the total
obligations).
The data for these are provided in Figures 8 and 9 respectively. We note that, as in Example 4.2
above, the price of debt with full network effects is generally comparable to the single firm effect
case with all interbank assets treated as the risky asset. In fact, the interest rate of debt
with full network effects is lower than if all interbank assets are treated as the risky asset, but
significantly higher than when interbank assets are treated as the risk-free asset. In contrast, and
again comparable to that in Example 4.2 above, the market capitalization for firms is strikingly
similar between the full network effects and the single firm effects with interbank assets treated
as the risk-free asset. The single firm effects with interbank assets treated as the risky asset can
differ by a large degree from the network effects for the market capitalization of the individual
firms.
Second, though above we consider the setting without bankruptcy costs, we now wish to
consider how the price of debt and equity are affected by the bankruptcy costs. Analytically,
we can conclude before any simulations, that the effective interest rates will decrease and the
market capitalization will increase with the recovery rate β. Figure 10 depicts the median price
of debt and market capitalization for the 87 banks under consideration; this demonstrates that
the comparisons made at high values of β that appear accurate lose their predictive power if
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Figure 8: Example 4.3: Comparison of the price of debt under network effects and under single
firm effects only without bankruptcy costs (β = 1).
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Figure 9: Example 4.3: Comparison of market capitalization under network effects and under single
firm effects only without bankruptcy costs (β = 1).
β < 1. Thus, if bankruptcy costs exist, considering the interbank assets as either the risk-free
or risky asset can cause mispricing of risk. Given the simulated network below, the full network
effects cause higher risk in both debt and equity than if each firm were treated individually.
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Figure 10: Example 4.3: Comparative statics on the recovery rate (β) to the market prices of debt
and equity.
5 Conclusion
In this work we present formulas for considering pricing of debt and equity of firms in a financial
network under comonotonic endowments. In particular, when the firms only invest in a risk-
free bond and a risky asset following a geometric Brownian motion, we are able to deduce
closed-form expressions for the price of debt and market capitalization for each firm in the
system. This methodology extends considerations of CVA for valuation adjustment so that the
whole financial network of counterparties is accounted for. While the comonotonic case requires
strong assumptions, it provides a lower bound for the price of debt under the framework of
Eisenberg and Noe [2001]. This is particularly valuable as financial networks are of particular
interest in performing stress tests and studying systemic risk.
The models considered herein are simple compared to many modern processes considered
for pricing financial instruments. Though updating the stochastic model of the risky asset
would be of interest, herein we will only propose a few extensions for more complete finan-
cial network models. First, we propose utilizing an extension of the Eisenberg-Noe framework
in which obligations are neither zero-coupon nor have the same maturities. Such an underly-
ing financial network has been proposed in Capponi and Chen [2015], Kusnetsov and Veraart
[2018], Banerjee et al. [2018]. In particular, Banerjee et al. [2018] already proposes a setting
with stochastic endowments, though it only considers defaults to occur at some terminal time.
We believe using mark-to-market pricing of debt and market capitalization would allow for
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more realistic determination of default times over an exogenous deficit level. Second, as during
systemic crises the failure of banks and drop in asset prices are inexplicably linked, we be-
lieve that including more complicated fire sale dynamics into this system would be of interest.
In particular, we highlight Amini et al. [2016], Feinstein [2017], Feinstein and El-Masri [2017],
Cont and Wagalath [2013, 2016] as possible underlying models for use in pricing with price im-
pact dynamics. Finally, as highlighted in many empirical works such as Hałaj and Kok [2013,
2015], Elsinger et al. [2013], Anand et al. [2017], the network is typically unknown and needs to
be estimated from partial information. Thus sensitivity analysis of pricing under misspecification
of the network would be of interest. In the static, deterministic, setting of Eisenberg and Noe
[2001] this was studied by Feinstein et al. [2018].
A Expectations under random endowments
In this section we wish to consider a partition of the endowment space Rn+ into regions so that
the defaulting set is constant in the 2n subsets. This problem was considered in great detail
in Gouriéroux et al. [2012] for the setting without bankruptcy costs, i.e. β = 1, and with cross-
ownership. Herein we will present a quick extension that allows for bankruptcy costs, i.e. for any
β ∈ [0, 1]. Notably, when β < 1 the partitions need not be convex sets, while they are convex
polyhedrons in a system without bankruptcy costs as given in Gouriéroux et al. [2012]. In the
below, if cross-ownership is desired then we refer to Remark 3.6 for the modifications necessary
to the mappings ∆ and δ¯.
To consider the partitions, fix z ∈ {0, 1}n to denote the defaulting banks. By construction,
the resulting wealths given endowments x ∈ Rn+ are provided by V (x) = ∆(z)x − δ¯(z). For
an endowment vector to be consistent with the defaulting set z, it would need to be such that
Vi(x) ≥ 0 if and only if zi = 0. That is, the set of endowments that generate the defaulting set
z is given by the system of inequalities:
e⊤i ∆(z)x ≥ e⊤i δ¯(z) ∀i : zi = 0
e⊤i ∆(z)x < e
⊤
i δ¯(z) ∀i : zi = 1.
However, except in the special case that there are no bankruptcy costs (β = 1), these regions
need not be disjoint. If an endowment x has two clearing wealth vectors V 1 6= V 2, then it must
be that z1 6= z2 where zk = I{V k<0}. If z1 = z2 then, by construction of ∆(zk), δ¯(zk), it must
follow that V 1 = V 2. In particular, we are interested in the maximal clearing wealth, thus we
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can construct the partition from the least to greatest number of defaults by considering the set
of endowments that lead to z by X (z) ⊆ Rn+ defined as:
X (z) :=
x ∈ Rn+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ e
⊤
i ∆(z)x ≥ e⊤i δ¯(z) ∀i : zi = 0,
e⊤i ∆(z)x < e
⊤
i δ¯(z) ∀i : zi = 1
 ∩ ⋂
z¯z
X (z¯)c.
That is, X (z) is constructed as the intersection of a finite number of closed and open halfspaces
as well as an additional condition that x 6∈ ⋃z¯z X (z¯). This additional condition is the one that
guarantees that x ∈ X (z) does not provide a “better” (i.e. fewer defaulting banks) clearing wealth
vector than the maximal clearing solution V (x). By the use of Tarski’s fixed point theorem in
the proof of Proposition 2.1, we are able to guarantee that this construction of X (z) is now, in
fact, disjoint. In Figure 11 we provide an image of the partitioning of the endowment space for
a small network with 2 banks plus a societal node. We note that the societal node in this image
can never default, this is due to it having no liabilities and thus always a nonnegative wealth.
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Figure 11: Sample partition of the endowment space into default regions for 2 bank plus societal
node network with bankruptcy costs.
Lastly, we wish to consider the particular case without bankruptcy costs (β = 1) as provided
by Gouriéroux et al. [2012]. Due to the uniqueness of the clearing wealths (Corollary 2.2) in
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this case we obtain only a single consistent default set z ∈ {0, 1}n for every endowment x ∈ Rn+
and thus do not need to take a secondary intersection as in the case with bankruptcy costs.
Further, in this case, those banks with 0 wealth can be considered equivalently both solvent and
defaulting; thus the set of endowments that produce z ∈ {0, 1}n can be considered as the finite
intersection of closed halfspaces only, i.e. the convex polyhedron:
X (z) := {x ∈ Rn+ | (I − 2 diag(z))∆(z)x ≥ (I − 2 diag(z))δ¯(z)} .
We note that the partition (X (z))z∈{0,1}n is no longer disjoint as boundaries would be shared
by the partitions. However, on this shared boundary the clearing wealths and payments will be
equivalent, and this intersection has Lebesgue measure 0, therefore we (and prior authors) have
discounted this situation for ease of constructing the sets X (z).
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